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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-2306 
______________ 
 
HUGH B. MCCLUSKEY, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.;  
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEW JERSEY, INC.  
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-01427) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2019 
 
Before: CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 16, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Hugh McCluskey appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his action based on the 
doctrine of issue preclusion. Finding no error, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 McCluskey and his long-time business associates, Michael and Alfred Luciano, 
entered into a series of agreements with Morris County Transfer Station, Inc. (“MCTS”) 
providing royalty payments. Waste Management, Inc. and Waste Management of New 
Jersey, Inc. (together, “Waste Management”) became the legal successor to MCTS and in 
2013, stopped making those payments. So the Lucianos sued Waste Management in New 
Jersey state court for breach of contract. The New Jersey Superior Court twice rejected 
their claim. 
 And, importantly, McCluskey participated in both state proceedings. For example, 
when Waste Management filed a third-party complaint against McCluskey, he 
counterclaimed for breach of contract. Then, after McCluskey and Waste Management’s 
claims against each other were dismissed by consent, McCluskey joined the Lucianos’ 
appeal. He submitted a brief to the court identifying himself as “Third Party Defendant – 
Respondent”2 (Suppl. App. at 091), and the record shows he offered oral argument on his 
own behalf. Not surprisingly, the Appellate Division’s decision reflects McCluskey’s role 
                                              
2 In his briefing, McCluskey claims to have participated in the appeal as amicus 
curiae. But that is not how he signed his appellate brief, and the Appellate Division labeled 
him as “respondent” in the caption of its opinion. (Suppl. App. at 093.) 
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in the lawsuit, holding the trial court “correctly determined that the Lucianos’ and 
McCluskey’s right to royalties” had been terminated. (Suppl. App. at 110.) 
 McCluskey then sued in federal court for the same claim—that Waste Management 
breached its obligation to him when it ceased making royalty payments. Waste 
Management moved to dismiss, and the District Court granted the motion with prejudice. 
The District Court held that McCluskey’s claims were barred under the doctrine of issue 
preclusion because “the issue [McCluskey] raises in this suit – whether [he] is owed 
royalties . . . is identical to that litigated in state court” and because “[t]hose tribunals issued 
final judgments on the merits of the issue, which was essential to those judgments.” (App. 
at 10.) Thus, “the question of whether Waste Management owes [McCluskey] royalties . . 
. has already been resolved [in state court] and may not be relitigated here[.]” (App. at 10.) 
McCluskey appealed that judgment to this Court. We agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion and will affirm.3 
II. MCCLUSKEY’S CLAIMS ARE PRECLUDED 
 Congress has long required that federal courts give preclusive effect to state court 
adjudications. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 
4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (“When a prior case has been adjudicated in a state court, 
federal courts are required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to give full faith and credit to the state 
judgment[.]”). When so doing, courts must “apply the same preclusion rules as would the 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As the District Court 
dismissed McCluskey’s claim with prejudice, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review is plenary. United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 486 
(3d Cir. 2017). 
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courts of that state.” Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 189 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95–
105 (1980)). On that basis, we apply the principles of issue preclusion as established under 
New Jersey law. 
 Under a five-factor test, New Jersey precludes reconsideration of an issue when (1) 
the issue is identical; (2) the issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding; (3) the prior 
court issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) determination of the issue was essential to 
the prior judgment; and (5) the party opposing preclusion was either a party to, or in privity 
with a party to, the earlier proceeding. See Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of 
Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re Estate of Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026, 
1034–35 (N.J. 1994)). McCluskey’s federal action satisfies each. 
 His demand for royalty payments from Waste Management is the same as the suit 
brought by the Lucianos. And that issue was twice argued and was twice adjudicated: 
initially by the trial court’s dismissal, and later on appeal. See A.T. v. Cohen, 175 A.3d 932, 
940 (N.J. 2017) (noting that in New Jersey a dismissal with prejudice is a judgment on the 
merits). What is more, the decisions were essential to the outcome; indeed, they rejected 
the very basis of the claim. Finally, McCluskey was a party to the prior action, or in privity 
with a party. McCluskey argues that because he consented to dismissal of his state 
counterclaim, he has yet to have a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” his claims. 
(Opening Br. at 14.) Not so. 
 First, McCluskey participated in the state action before his voluntary dismissal. And 
after dismissal, he joined in the appellate proceedings by submitting briefing and offering 
argument as a “Third Party Defendant – Respondent.” Second, even if McCluskey was not 
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a party, he was in privity with the Lucianos. In New Jersey, a relationship is “close enough” 
to satisfy privity “when the party is a virtual representative of the non-party, or when the 
non-party actually controls the litigation.” Collins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 34 
F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, “one person is in privity with another and is bound by 
and entitled to the benefits of a judgment as though he was a party when there is such an 
identification of interest between the two as to represent the same legal right.” Zirger v. 
Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 676 A.2d 1065, 1071 (N.J. 1996) (citation omitted). That is the 
case here. Had the Lucianos prevailed in state court, as a signatory and beneficiary of that 
same 1990 agreement, McCluskey would have benefited from the judgment. Either way, 
the doctrine of issue preclusion bars McCluskey from his present action in federal court. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
                                              
4 McCluskey raises several other issues which do not state a claim for relief. He 
argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his suit because he is entitled to a jury 
trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. But that is not 
correct. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Haase v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 631 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014). He also argues—
without explanation—that the dismissal violated his due process rights. The District Court 
properly acted within the rules of civil procedure when it dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice based on Waste Management’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). Lastly, McCluskey argues that this Court should vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal under the dual-sovereignty doctrine. But that doctrine applies to criminal, not 
civil matters. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1965–66 (2019). 
